


# 20 Years of Australia Group Cooperation

1985 1995



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Many thanks to Australia Group Chair for suggestions

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## Foreword - 20 Years of Australia Group Cooperation

It is 20 years since Australia convened the first meeting of 15 like-minded countries in 1985 in Brussels. That meeting addressed Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, and posed the question of how to prevent Iraq from acquiring materials for the production of chemical weapons through otherwise legitimate commercial trade. The response - a proposal to harmonise national export controls - was endorsed by all present at that meeting and the Australia Group was born.

The Group's achievements over the past 20 years have been significant. The common control lists it has developed have significantly restricted opportunities for would-be proliferators to source the materials and technologies required for making chemical and biological weapons (CBW). They have also protected participants from inadvertently allowing CBW-relevant items to fall into the wrong hands.

The growth in participation in the Group - from 15 participants in 1985 to 38 countries plus the European Commission today - is evidence of its success in promoting balanced and consistent national export controls. An increasing number of non-participating countries are also looking to the Group's control lists and measures in the formulation of their own national export controls. This acceptance of Australia Group standards as an international benchmark for CBW-related export control provides clear evidence that the strategies of the Group work to promote secure trade without restricting legitimate trade. The Australia Group cannot afford to rest on its laurels. The international security environment has changed markedly over recent years, and the global threat posed by CBW is, in some respects, more challenging today. The threat of CBW terrorism is very real and growing. Several countries continue to pursue actively WMD programs in defiance of international non-proliferation norms.

Further, proliferators are resorting to ever more sophisticated methods for procuring the materials they require to manufacture CBW. Difficult issues such as transshipment, brokering, intangible technology transfer and the rapid pace of technological change require special attention and innovative solutions.

We need to keep our export controls under constant review to ensure that they are continuing to contribute meaningfully to global security. Developing the work of the Australia Group to meet this challenge is no easy task, but a necessary one to ensure that its work remains relevant and effective.

Peter Shannon  
Australia Group Chair

## Introduction to the Australia Group

The Australia Group is an informal arrangement which aims to allow exporting or transshipping countries to minimise the risk of

assisting in chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. The Group meets annually to discuss ways of increasing the effectiveness of participating countries' national export licensing measures to prevent would-be proliferators from obtaining materials for CBW programs.

Australia Group participants do not undertake legally-binding obligations. The effectiveness of their cooperation depends solely on their commitment to CBW non-proliferation goals and the strength of their respective national measures.

Key considerations in the formulation of participants' export licensing measures are:

- they should be effective in impeding the production of chemical and biological weapons;
- they should be practical, and reasonably easy to implement;
- they should not impede the normal trade of materials and equipment used for legitimate purposes.

All states participating in the Australia Group are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and strongly support efforts under those Conventions to rid the world of chemical and biological weapons.



# Australia Group Participants



## Origins of the Australia Group

In April 1984, a number of countries placed licensing measures on the export of certain chemicals that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons (CW). These countries took this action in response to:

- the findings of a UN investigatory mission that Iraq had used CW in the Iran-Iraq war in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol;
- clear evidence that Iraq had obtained many of the materials for its CW program through legitimate trade channels.

The countries concerned saw an urgent need to address the spread of CW, and to ensure that their industries were not, either intentionally or inadvertently, assisting other states to acquire and use such weapons in violation of international law and norms.

The measures these countries imposed were not, however, uniform either in scope or in application. It became apparent that attempts were being made to exploit differences or ambiguities to circumvent the controls and obtain materials and technology for the production of CW.

This led Australia to propose, in April 1985, that countries which had introduced export licensing measures meet in order to harmonise their controls and enhance cooperation. The first meeting of what subsequently became known as the Australia Group took place in Brussels in June 1985. All participating countries agreed there was benefit in continuing the process, and meetings of the Australia Group are now held in Paris on an annual basis.

In 1990, the Australia Group took steps to address the spread of biological weapons (BW) in response to increasing evidence that dual-use materials were being used in BW programs.

The number of countries participating in the Australia Group has grown from 15 in 1985 to 38 plus the European Commission.

## Australia Group Objectives

CBW are indiscriminate in their application, and their deadly effects have been known since ancient times. They were first used on a large scale in the First World War, with soldiers being exposed to poisonous gases, including phosgene, and sulphur mustard (a blistering agent). The result was over one million casualties and approximately 100,000 fatalities. Since that time, CBW technology has become more advanced, and hence even more lethal. The use by Iraq of CW in the form of nerve agents and sulphur mustard in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and the 1995 poison gas (sarin) attack on the Tokyo underground, provide chilling examples of the indiscriminate and inhumane effects of these weapons.

The principal objective of Australia Group participants is thus to use licensing measures to ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment, do not contribute to the spread of CBW. The Group achieves this by harmonising participating countries' national export licensing measures.

The Group's activities are especially important given that the international chemical and biological industries are a target for proliferators as a source of materials for CBW programs.

Participants have recognised from the outset that export licensing measures are not a substitute for the strict and universal observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). All Australia Group participants are States Parties to both the BWC and the CWC. Support for these regimes and their aims remains the overriding objective of Australia Group participants. Export licensing measures instituted by individual participants assist in implementing key obligations under the CWC (Article I, 1 (a) and (d)) and the BWC (Articles I and III).

Export licensing measures also demonstrate participants' determination to avoid not only direct but also inadvertent involvement in the spread of CBW, and to express their opposition to the use of these weapons. It is also in the interests of commercial firms and research institutes and of their governments to ensure that they do not inadvertently supply chemicals, chemical equipment, biological agents or biological equipment for use in the manufacture of CBW. Global chemical and biological industries have firmly supported this principle.

## Australia Group Activities

The Australia Group is an informal arrangement. The purpose of Australia Group meetings is to explore scope for increasing the effectiveness of existing controls, including through information exchange, the harmonisation of national measures and, where necessary, the consideration of additional measures.

All participants have licensing measures over 63 chemical weapons precursors. Participants also require licences for the export of:

- Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment and related technology;
- Plant pathogens;
- Animal pathogens;
- Biological agents; and
- Dual-use biological equipment.

The above items form the basis for the Group's 'common control lists', which have been developed during Australia Group consultations and are adjusted from time to time to ensure their continued effectiveness. Measures agreed by meetings of the Group are applied on a national basis, although all participants agree they will be more effective if similar measures are introduced by all potential exporters of relevant chemicals, biological agents and equipment and by countries of possible transshipment. Under these measures, exports are denied only if there is a well - founded concern about potential diversion for CBW purposes.

Australia Group participants encourage all countries to take the necessary steps to ensure that they and their industries are not contributing to the spread of CBW. Export licensing measures demonstrate the determination of AG countries to avoid involvement in the proliferation of these weapons in violation of international law and norms.

## Relationship with the Chemical Weapons Convention

Australia Group participants strongly supported the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva leading to the conclusion of the CWC. They became original signatories to the Convention when it opened for signature in Paris in January 1993 and are States Parties to that Convention. They are now playing an active and constructive role in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague.

The CWC contains a number of provisions relating to the transfer of chemicals which may be diverted to CW programs. Article I of the CWC prohibits States Parties from assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone to engage in activity prohibited by the Convention, or from developing, producing, acquiring, or stockpiling chemical weapons. Article VI requires States Parties to ensure that the development, production, acquisition, retention, transfer or use of toxic chemicals and their precursors does not take place for purposes prohibited by the Convention. In addition, Parts VI, VII and VIII of the Annex on Implementation and Verification impose specific restrictions on the trade in chemicals listed in the Schedules to the Convention.

Participation in the Australia Group reflects support for the CWC as the principal instrument for addressing the threat posed by chemical weapons. Australia Group participants believe their involvement in the Group is fully consistent with the CWC and indeed is an effective means of implementing the key obligations in the CWC listed above. The establishment of efficient national export licensing mechanisms serves to strengthen the non-proliferation goals of the CWC, whilst at the same time encouraging trade in chemical materials for legitimate, peaceful purposes.

## Relationship with the Biological Weapons Convention

All of the participants in the Australia Group are States Parties to the BWC, which has been in force since 1975. They have also been active in efforts to strengthen the Treaty, including through active participation in the confidence-building measures agreed by successive BWC review conferences and in annual meetings since the Fifth Review Conference in 2001.

Article I of the BWC prohibits States Parties from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining biological agents and toxins, or related biological weapons or equipment. Article III of the BWC obliges States Parties to prevent the transfer of materials which might assist the manufacture, or any means of acquiring, biological weapons. The Australia Group's activities serve to support the objectives of the BWC by enhancing the effectiveness of national export licensing measures.

## The Australia Group and Legitimate Trade

Australia Group participants see export licensing as a vital means of ensuring that legitimate trade in chemicals, biological agents and related equipment can proceed unfettered. Careful regulation of potentially sensitive exports helps to reduce the risk that companies will unwittingly export products for use in CBW programs, and therefore attract severe penalties. This gives companies greater confidence to trade in products which have the potential to be used in the production of CBW.

Licensing measures resulting from the Australia Group's operations have a minimal impact on total trade in chemicals, biological agents and dual-use items and equipment. Export licences deter proliferation by increasing visibility of trade in relevant materials, and provide authority to stop a sale if the product concerned is likely to contribute to a CBW program. The licensing measures applied by Australia Group participants thus affect only sales to a small number of countries where there is evidence of an interest in developing or maintaining a CBW capacity. The Group's activities are limited to counter-proliferation measures, and are neither intended to favour the commercial development of industries in participating states, nor to hinder legitimate economic development in other countries.

## Australia Group Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items

The Government of xxx has, after careful consideration and consistent with its obligations under the BTWC and the CWC, decided that, when considering the transfer of equipment, materials, and technology that could contribute to chemical and biological weapons activities, it will act in accordance with the following Guidelines.

1. The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of proliferation and terrorism involving chemical and biological weapons (CBW) by controlling transfers that could contribute to CBW activities by states or non-state actors, consistent with Article III of the Biological Weapons Convention, Article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. In accordance with Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention and Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention, these Guidelines are not intended to impede chemical or biological trade or international cooperation that could not contribute to CBW activities or terrorism. These Guidelines, including the attached Australia Group (AG) control lists and subsequent amendments thereto, form the basis for controlling transfers to any destination beyond the Government's national jurisdiction or control of materials, equipment, and technology that could contribute to CBW activities. The Government will implement these Guidelines in accordance with its national legislation.
2. These Guidelines will be applied to each transfer of any item in the AG control lists. However, it is a matter for the Government's discretion to determine whether and to what extent to apply expedited licensing measures in the case of transfers to destinations it judges possess consistently excellent non proliferation credentials. Vigilance will be exercised in the consideration of all transfers of items on the AG control lists. Transfers will be denied if the Government judges, on the basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated according to factors including those in paragraph 3, that the controlled items are intended to be used in a chemical weapons or biological weapons program, or for CBW terrorism, or that a significant risk of diversion exists. It is understood that the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgment of the Government.
3. In fulfilling the purposes of these Guidelines, national export control legislation, including enforcement and sanctions for violations, plays an important role.

## Australia Group Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items

4. To fulfil the purposes of these Guidelines, the evaluation of export applications will take into account the following non-exhaustive list of factors:
  - A) Information about proliferation and terrorism involving CBW, including any proliferation or terrorism-related activity, or about involvement in clandestine or illegal procurement activities, of the parties to the transaction;
  - b) The capabilities and objectives of the chemical and biological activities of the recipient state;
  - c) The significance of the transfer in terms of (1) the appropriateness of the stated end-use, including any relevant assurances submitted by the recipient state or end-user, and (2) the potential development of CBW;
  - d) The assessment of the end-use of the transfer, including whether a transfer has been previously denied to the end-user, whether the end-user has diverted for unauthorized purposes any transfer previously authorized, and, to the extent possible, whether the end-user is capable of securely handling and storing the item transferred;
  - e) The extent and effectiveness of the export control system in the recipient state as well as any intermediary states;
  - f) The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements, including the BTWC and CWC.
5. In a manner consistent with its national legislation and practices, the Government should, before authorizing a transfer of an AG-controlled item, either (a) satisfy itself that goods are not intended for reexport; (b) satisfy itself that, if reexported, the goods would be controlled by the recipient government pursuant to these guidelines; or (c) obtain satisfactory assurances that its consent will be secured prior to any retransfer to a third country.
6. The objective of these Guidelines should not be defeated by the transfer of any non-controlled item containing one or more controlled components where the controlled component(s) are the principal element of the item and can feasibly be removed or used for other purposes. (In judging whether the controlled component(s) are to be considered the principal element, the Government will weigh the factors of quantity, value, and technological know-how involved and other special circumstances that might establish the controlled component or components as the principal element of the item being procured.)

## Australia Group Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items

The objective of these Guidelines also should not be defeated by the transfer of a whole plant, on any scale, that has been designed to produce any CBW agent or AG-controlled precursor chemical.

7. The Government reserves the discretion to: (a) apply additional conditions for transfer that it may consider necessary; (b) apply these guidelines to items not on the AG control lists; and c) apply measures to restrict exports for other reasons of public policy consistent with its treaty obligations.
8. In furtherance of the effective operation of the Guidelines, the Government will, as necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant information with other governments applying the same Guidelines.
9. The Government encourages the adherence of all states to these Guidelines in the interest of international peace and security.

(Latest versions of Control Lists to be attached)

### Further provisions applicable to Australia Group Participants

In addition, participants in the Australia Group, consistent with their obligations under the BTWC and CWC and in accordance with their national legislation have, after careful consideration, decided also to give equal respect to the following provisions.

#### Catch-All

1. Participant states will ensure that their regulations require the following:
  - (A) an authorisation for the transfer of non-listed items where the exporter is informed by the competent authorities of the Participant State in which it is established that the items in question may be intended, in their entirety or part, for use in connection with chemical or biological weapons activities;
  - (b) that if the exporter is aware that non-listed items are intended to contribute to such activities it must notify the authorities referred to above, which will decide whether or not it is expedient to make the export concerned subject to authorisation.

## Australia Group Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items

2. Participant states are encouraged to share information on these measures on a regular basis, and to exchange information on catch-all denials relevant for the purpose of the AG.

### No Undercut Policy

3. In accordance with the Group's agreed procedures, a license for an export that is essentially identical to one denied by another AG participant will only be granted after consultations with that participant, provided it has not expired or been rescinded. Essentially identical is defined as being the same biological agent or chemical or, in the case of dual-use equipment, equipment which has the same or similar specifications and performance being sold to the same consignee. The terms of the Group's 'no undercut policy' do not apply to denials of items under national catch-all provisions.

### Common Approaches

4. AG participants implement these Guidelines in accordance with the Group's agreed common approaches on end-user undertakings and chemical mixtures.

### Intra EU Trade<sup>1</sup>

5. So far as trade within the European Union is concerned, each member State of the European Union will implement the Guidelines in the light of its commitments as a member of the Union.

<sup>1</sup>This provision applies to members of the European Union.

## United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004**

*The Security Council,*

*Affirming* that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,\* constitutes a threat to international peace and Security,

*Reaffirming*, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

*Recalling* also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

*Affirming* its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

*Affirming* its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability,

*Welcoming* efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation,

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\* Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:

Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.

Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.

Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

## United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

*Affirming* that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation,

*Gravely concerned* by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors\* such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

*Gravely concerned* by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,\* which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security,

*Recognizing* the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,

*Recognizing* that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,

*Recognizing further* the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,

*Encouraging* all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party,

## United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

*Reaffirming* the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist Acts,

*Determined* to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides that* all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
2. *Decides also* that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;
3. *Decides also* that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:
  - (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
  - (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

## United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

- (c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;
- (d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;
4. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution;
5. *Decides* that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
6. *Recognizes* the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists

## United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

7. *Recognizes* that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions;
8. *Calls upon* all States:
- (a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;
  - (b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral nonproliferation treaties;
  - (c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;
  - (d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;
9. *Calls upon* all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;
10. Further to counter that threat, *calls upon* all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

## United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

11. *Expresses* its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end;
12. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

## Internet Links to National Export Control Sites

 Argentina	<a href="http://www.cancilleria.gov.ar">http://www.cancilleria.gov.ar</a>
 Australia	<a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/strategy/dtcc/default.htm">http://www.defence.gov.au/strategy/dtcc/default.htm</a>
 Canada	<a href="http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/eicbintro-en.asp">http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/eicbintro-en.asp</a>
 Denmark	<a href="http://www.efs.dk/eksport/handelsp/2/default.html">http://www.efs.dk/eksport/handelsp/2/default.html</a> <a href="http://www.opcw.org/natfiles/denstart.htm">http://www.opcw.org/natfiles/denstart.htm</a>
 Finland	<a href="http://www.vn.fi/plm/index.html">http://www.vn.fi/plm/index.html</a> <a href="http://www.vn.fi/ktm/vientiv">http://www.vn.fi/ktm/vientiv</a>
 Germany	<a href="http://www.bundesausfuhramt.de">http://www.bundesausfuhramt.de</a>
 Hungary	<a href="http://212.108.197.140/kulfold/english/gm/org.htm#lao">http://212.108.197.140/kulfold/english/gm/org.htm#lao</a>
 Iceland	<a href="http://www.mfa.is">http://www.mfa.is</a>
 Ireland	<a href="http://www.entemp.ie/explore">http://www.entemp.ie/explore</a>

## Internet Links to National Export Control Sites

 Italy	<a href="http://www.mincomes.it/menu/dualuse.htm">http://www.mincomes.it/menu/dualuse.htm</a>
 Japan	<a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/index.html">http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/index.html</a>
 Norway	<a href="http://odin.dep.no">http://odin.dep.no</a>
 Romania	<a href="http://www.ancex.ro">http://www.ancex.ro</a> <a href="http://www.export-control.ro">http://www.export-control.ro</a>
 Spain	<a href="http://www.mcx.es/sgcomex/mddu">http://www.mcx.es/sgcomex/mddu</a>
 Sweden	<a href="http://www.tullverket.se">http://www.tullverket.se</a> <a href="http://www.isp.se">http://www.isp.se</a>
 Switzerland	<a href="http://www.seco-admin.ch">http://www.seco-admin.ch</a>
 United Kingdom	<a href="http://www.dti.gov.uk/export.control">http://www.dti.gov.uk/export.control</a>
 United States	<a href="http://www.state.gov">http://www.state.gov</a> <a href="http://www.bxa.doc.gov/reslinks.htm#Intl/GovResources">http://www.bxa.doc.gov/reslinks.htm#Intl/GovResources</a> <a href="http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureaunp.html">http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureaunp.html</a>

## Chemical weapons precursors

	PRECURSOR CHEMICAL	CAS NO.	CWC-SCHEDULE
1	Thiodiglycol	(111-48-8)	2B
2	Phosphorus oxychloride	(10025-87-3)	3B
3	Dimethyl methylphosphonate	(756-79-6)	2B
4	Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF)	(676-99-3)	1B
5	Methylphosphonyl dichloride (DC)	(676-97-1)	2B
6	Dimethyl phosphite (DMP)	(868-85-9)	3B
7	Phosphorus trichloride	(7719-12-2)	3B
8	Trimethyl phosphite (TMP)	(121-45-9)	3B
9	Thionyl chloride	(7719-09-7)	3B
10	3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine	(3554-74-3)	Not Listed
11	N,N-Diisopropyl-(beta)-aminoethyl chloride	(96-79-7)	2B
12	N,N-Diisopropyl-(beta)-aminoethane thiol	(5842-07-9)	2B
13	3-Quinuclidinol	(1619-34-7)	2B
14	Potassium fluoride	(7789-23-3)	Not Listed
15	2-Chloroethanol	(107-07-3)	Not Listed
16	Dimethylamine	(124-40-3)	Not Listed
17	Diethyl ethylphosphonate	(78-38-6)	2B
18	Diethyl N,N-dimethylsophoramidate	(2404-03-7)	2B
19	Diethyl phosphite	(762-04-9)	3B
20	Dimethylamine hydrochloride	(506-59-2)	Not Listed
21	Ethylphosphinyl dichloride	(1498-40-4)	2B
22	Ethylphosphonyl dichloride	(1066-50-8)	2B
23	Ethylphosphonyl difluoride	(753-98-0)	1B

## Chemical weapons precursors

	PRECURSOR CHEMICAL	CAS NO.	CWC-SCHEDULE
24	Hydrogen fluoride	(7664-39-3)	Not Listed
25	Methyl benzilate	(76-89-1)	Not Listed
26	Methylphosphinyl dichloride	(676-83-5)	2B
27	N,N-Diisopropyl-(beta)-amino-ethanol	(96-80-0)	2B
28	Pinacolyl alcohol	(464-07-3)	2B
29	O-Ethyl 2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite (QL)	(57856-11-8)	1B
30	Triethyl phosphite	(122-52-1)	3B
31	Arsenic trichloride	(7784-34-1)	2B
32	Benzilic acid	(76-93-7)	2B
33	Diethyl methylphosphonite	(15715-41-0)	2B
34	Dimethyl ethylphosphonate	(6163-75-3)	2B
35	Ethylphosphinyl difluoride	(430-78-4)	2B
36	Methylphosphinyl difluoride	(753-59-3)	2B
37	3-Quinuclidone	(3731-38-2)	Not Listed
38	Phosphorus pentachloride	(10026-13-8)	3B
39	Pinacolone	(75-97-8)	Not Listed
40	Potassium cyanide	(151-50-8)	Not Listed
41	Potassium bifluoride	(7789-29-9)	Not Listed
42	Ammonium bifluoride	(1341-49-7)	Not Listed
43	Sodium bifluoride	(1333-83-1)	Not Listed
44	Sodium fluoride	(7681-49-4)	Not Listed
45	Sodium cyanide	(143-33-9)	Not Listed

## Chemical weapons precursors

	PRECURSOR CHEMICAL	CAS NO.	CWC-SCHEDULE
46	Triethanolamine	(102-71-6)	3B
47	Phosphorus pentasulphide	(1314-80-3)	Not Listed
48	Diisopropylamine	(108-18-9)	Not Listed
49	Diethylaminoethanol	(100-37-8)	Not Listed
50	Sodium sulphide	(1313-82-2)	Not Listed
51	Sulphur monochloride	(10025-67-9)	3B
52	Sulphur dichloride	(10545-99-0)	3B
53	Triethanolamine hydrochloride	(637-39-8)	Not Listed
54	N,N-Diisopropyl-2-aminoethyl chloride hydrochloride	(4261-68-1)	2B
55	Methylphosphonic acid	(993-13-5)	2B
56	Diethyl methylphosphonate	(683-08-9)	2B
57	N,N-Dimethylaminophosphoryl dichloride	(677-43-0)	2B
58	Triisopropyl phosphite	(116-17-6)	Not Listed
59	Ethyldiethanolamine	(139-87-7)	3B
60	O,O-Diethyl phosphorothioate	(2465-65-8)	Not Listed
61	O,O-Diethyl phosphorodithioate	(298-06-6)	Not Listed
62	Sodium hexafluorosilicate	(16893-85-9)	Not Listed
63	Methylphosphonothioic dichloride	(676-98-2)	2B

## Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment and related technology

### I. MANUFACTURING FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

**Note 1.** *The objective of these controls should not be defeated by the transfer of any non-controlled item containing one or more controlled components where the controlled component or components are the principal element of the item and can feasibly be removed or used for other purposes.*

**N.B.** *In judging whether the controlled component or components are to be considered the principal element, governments should weigh the factors of quantity, value, and technological know-how involved and other special circumstances which might establish the controlled component or components as the principal element of the item being procured.*

**Note 2.** *The objective of these controls should not be defeated by the transfer of a whole plant, on any scale, which has been designed to produce any CW agent or AG-controlled precursor chemical.*

#### 1. Reaction Vessels, Reactors or Agitators

Reaction vessels or reactors, with or without agitators, with total internal (geometric) volume greater than 0.1 m<sup>3</sup> (100 l) and less than 20 m<sup>3</sup> (20000 l), where all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed or contained are made from the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight;
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight;
- (c) fluoropolymers;
- (d) glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enamelled coating);
- (e) tantalum or tantalum alloys;
- (f) titanium or titanium alloys; or
- (g) zirconium or zirconium alloys.

Agitators for use in the above-mentioned reaction vessels or reactors; and impellers, blades or shafts designed for such agitators, where all surfaces of the agitator or component that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed or contained are made from the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight;
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight;
- (c) fluoropolymers;

## Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment and related technology

- (d) glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enamelled coating);
- (e) tantalum or tantalum alloys;
- (f) titanium or titanium alloys; or
- (g) zirconium or zirconium alloys.

### 2. Storage Tanks, Containers or Receivers

Storage tanks, containers or receivers with a total internal (geometric) volume greater than 0.1 m<sup>3</sup> (100 l) where all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed or contained are made from the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight;
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight;
- (c) fluoropolymers;
- (d) glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enamelled coating);
- (e) tantalum or tantalum alloys;
- (f) titanium or titanium alloys; or
- (G) zirconium or zirconium alloys.

### 3. Heat Exchangers or Condensers

Heat exchangers or condensers with a heat transfer surface area of greater than 0.15 m<sup>2</sup>, and less than 20 m<sup>2</sup>; and tubes, plates, coils or blocks (cores) designed for such heat exchangers or condensers, where all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed are made from the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight;
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight;
- (c) fluoropolymers;
- (d) glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enamelled coating);
- (e) graphite or carbon graphite;
- (f) tantalum or tantalum alloys;
- (g) titanium or titanium alloys;
- (h) zirconium or zirconium alloys;
- (l) silicon carbide; or
- (j) titanium carbide.

Technical note: carbon graphite is a composition consisting of amorphous carbon and graphite, in which the graphite content is eight percent or more by weight.

## Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment and related technology

### 4. Distillation or Absorption Columns

Distillation or absorption columns of internal diameter greater than 0.1 m; and liquid distributors, vapour distributors or liquid collectors designed for such distillation or absorption columns, where all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed are made from the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight;
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight;
- (c) fluoropolymers;
- (d) glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enamelled coating);
- (e) graphite or carbon graphite;
- (f) tantalum or tantalum alloys;
- (g) titanium or titanium alloys; or
- (h) zirconium or zirconium alloys.

Technical note: carbon graphite is a composition consisting of amorphous carbon and graphite, in which the graphite content is eight percent or more by weight.

### 5. Filling Equipment

Remotely operated filling equipment in which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed are made from the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight; or
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight.

### 6. Valves

Valves with nominal sizes greater than 1.0 cm (3/8") and casings (valve bodies) or preformed casing liners designed for such valves, in which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being produced, processed, or contained are made from the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight;
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight;
- (c) fluoropolymers;
- (d) glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enamelled coating);
- (e) tantalum or tantalum alloys;
- (f) titanium or titanium alloys; or
- (g) zirconium or zirconium alloys.

## Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment and related technology

### 7. Multi-Walled Piping

Multi-walled piping incorporating a leak detection port, in which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed or contained are made from the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight;
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight;
- (c) fluoropolymers;
- (d) glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enamelled coating);
- (e) graphite or carbon graphite;
- (f) tantalum or tantalum alloys;
- (g) titanium or titanium alloys; or
- (h) zirconium or zirconium alloys.

Technical note: carbon graphite is a composition consisting of amorphous carbon and graphite, in which the graphite content is eight percent or more by weight.

### 8. Pumps

Multiple-seal, canned drive, magnetic drive, bellows or diaphragm pumps, with manufacturer's specified maximum flow-rate greater than 0.6 m<sup>3</sup>/h, or vacuum pumps with the manufacturer's specified maximum flow-rate greater than 5 m<sup>3</sup>/h (under standard temperature (0o C) and pressure (101.30 kPa) conditions); and casings (pump bodies), preformed casing liners, impellers, rotors or jet pump nozzles designed for such pumps, in which all surfaces that come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed are made from the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight;
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight;
- (c) fluoropolymers;
- (d) glass or glass-lined (including vitrified or enamelled coating);
- (e) graphite or carbon graphite;
- (f) tantalum or tantalum alloys;
- (g) titanium or titanium alloys;
- (h) zirconium or zirconium alloys;
- (i) ceramics; or
- (j) ferrosilicon.

## Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment and related technology

Technical note: carbon graphite is a composition consisting of amorphous carbon and graphite, in which the graphite content is eight percent or more by weight.

### 9. Incinerators

Incinerators designed to destroy CW agents, AG-controlled precursors or chemical munitions, having specially designed waste supply systems, special handling facilities, and an average combustion chamber temperature greater than 1000o C, in which all surfaces in the waste supply system that come into direct contact with the waste products are made from or lined with the following materials:

- (a) nickel or alloys with more than 40% nickel by weight;
- (b) alloys with more than 25% nickel and 20% chromium by weight; or
- (c) ceramics.

### Statement of Understanding

These controls do not apply to equipment which is specially designed for use in civil applications (for example food processing, pulp and paper processing, or water purification, etc) and is, by the nature of its design, inappropriate for use in storing, processing, producing or conducting and controlling the flow of chemical warfare agents or any of the AG-controlled precursor chemicals.

## II. TOXIC GAS MONITORING SYSTEMS AND DETECTORS

Toxic gas monitoring systems and dedicated detectors

- (a) designed for continuous operation and usable for the detection of chemical warfare agents or AG-controlled precursors at concentrations of less than 0.3 mg/m<sup>3</sup>; or
- (b) designed for the detection of cholinesterase-inhibiting activity.

## III. RELATED TECHNOLOGY

The transfer of 'technology', including licenses, directly associated with -

- CW agents;
- AG-controlled precursors; or
- AG-controlled dual-use equipment items, to the extent permitted by national legislation.

## Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment and related technology

Technical assistance is subject to control. Controls on 'technology' transfer, including 'technical assistance', do not apply to information 'in the public domain' or to 'basic scientific research' or the minimum necessary information for patent application.

The approval for export of any AG-controlled item of dual-use equipment also authorises the export to the same end-user of the minimum 'technology' required for the installation, operation, maintenance or repair of that item.

### Definition of Terms

#### **'Technology'**

Specific information necessary for the 'development', 'production' or 'use' of a product. The information takes the form of 'technical data' or 'technical assistance'.

#### **'Basic scientific research'**

Experimental or theoretical work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental principles of phenomena or observable facts, not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective.

#### **'Development'**

'Development' is related to all phases before 'production' such as:

- design
- design research
- design analysis
- design concepts
- assembly of prototypes
- pilot production schemes
- design data
- process or transforming design data into a product
- configuration design
- integration design
- Layouts

#### **'in the public domain'**

'In the public domain', as it applies herein, means technology that has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. (Copyright restrictions do not remove technology from being in the public domain).

## Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment and related technology

#### **'Production'**

Production means all production phases such as:

- construction
- production engineering
- manufacture
- integration
- assembly (mounting)
- inspection
- testing
- quality assurance

#### **'Technical assistance'**

May take forms, such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

N.B. 'Technical assistance' may involve transfer of 'technical data'.

#### **'Technical data'**

May take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

#### **'Use'**

Operation, installation (including on-site installation), maintenance (checking), repair, overhaul or refurbishing.

#### **'Export'**

An actual shipment or transmission of AG-controlled items out of the country. This includes transmission of technology by electronic media, fax or telephone.

## Dual-use biological equipment

### I. Equipment

#### 1. Complete containment facilities at P3 or P4 containment level

Complete containment facilities that meet the criteria for P3 or P4 (BL3, BL4, L3, L4) containment as specified in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety manual (2nd edition, Geneva, 1993) should be subject to export control.

#### 2. Fermenters

Fermenters capable of cultivation of pathogenic micro-organisms, viruses or for toxin production, without the propagation of aerosols, having a capacity of 20 litres or greater. Fermenters include bioreactors, chemostats and continuous-flow systems.

#### 3. Centrifugal Separators

Centrifugal separators capable of the continuous separation of pathogenic micro-organisms, without the propagation of aerosols, and having all the following characteristics:

- a) one or more sealing joints within the steam containment area;
- b) a flow rate greater than 100 litres per hour;
- c) components of polished stainless steel or titanium;
- d) capable of in-situ steam sterilisation in a closed state.

Technical note: Centrifugal separators include decanters.

#### 4. Cross (tangential) Flow Filtration Equipment

Cross (tangential) flow filtration equipment capable of separation of pathogenic micro-organisms, viruses, toxins or cell cultures, without the propagation of aerosols, having all the following characteristics:

- a) a total filtration area equal to or greater than 1 square metre;
- B) capable of being sterilized or disinfected in-situ.

(N.B. This control excludes reverse osmosis equipment, as specified by the manufacturer.)

Cross (tangential) flow filtration components (eg modules, elements, cassettes, cartridges, units or plates) with filtration area equal to or greater than 0.2 square metres for each component and designed for use in cross (tangential) flow filtration equipment as specified above.

## Dual-use biological equipment

Technical note: In this control, 'sterilized' denotes the elimination of all viable microbes from the equipment through the use of either physical (eg steam) or chemical agents. 'Disinfected' denotes the destruction of potential microbial infectivity in the equipment through the use of chemical agents with a germicidal effect. 'Disinfection' and 'sterilization' are distinct from 'sanitization', the latter referring to cleaning procedures designed to lower the microbial content of equipment without necessarily achieving elimination of all microbial infectivity or viability.

#### 5. Freeze-drying Equipment

Steam sterilisable freeze-drying equipment with a condenser capacity of 10 kgs of ice or greater in 24 hours and less than 1000 kgs of ice in 24 hours.

#### 6. Protective and containment equipment as follows:

- a) protective full or half suits, or hoods dependent upon a tethered external air supply and operating under positive pressure;  
Technical note: This does not control suits designed to be worn with self-contained breathing apparatus.
- b) class III biological safety cabinets or isolators with similar performance standards (e.g. flexible isolators, dry boxes, anaerobic chambers, glove boxes, or laminar flow hoods (closed with vertical flow)).

#### 7. Aerosol inhalation chambers

Chambers designed for aerosol challenge testing with micro-organisms, viruses or toxins and having a capacity of 1 cubic metre or greater.

Experts propose that the following item be included in awareness raising guidelines to industry:

1. Equipment for the micro-encapsulation of live micro-organisms and toxins in the range of 1-10 um particle size, specifically:
  - a) interfacial polycondensators;
  - b) phase separators.
2. Fermenters of less than 100 litre capacity with special emphasis on aggregate orders or designs for use in combined systems.
3. Conventional or turbulent air-flow clean-air rooms and self-contained fan-HEPA filter units that may be used for P3 or P4 (BL3, BL4, L3, L4) containment facilities.

## Dual-use biological equipment

### II. Related Technology

The transfer of 'technology' for 'development' or 'production' of:  
AG-controlled biological agents; or  
AG-controlled dual-use biological equipment items.

Controls on 'technology' transfer do not apply to information 'in the public domain' or to 'basic scientific research' or the minimum necessary information for patent application.

The approval for export of any AG-controlled item of dual-use equipment also authorises the export to the same end-user of the minimum 'technology' required for the installation, operation, maintenance, or repair of that item.

#### Definition of Terms

##### **'Technology'**

Specific information necessary for the 'development', 'production', or 'use' of a product. The information takes the form of 'technical data' or 'technical assistance'.

##### **'Basic scientific research'**

Experimental or theoretical work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental principles of phenomena or observable facts, not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective.

##### **'Development'**

'Development' is related to all stages before production such as:

- design,
- design research,
- design analysis,
- design concepts,
- assembly of prototypes,
- pilot production schemes,
- design data,
- process or transforming design data into a product,
- configuration design,
- integration design, and
- layouts.

## Dual-use biological equipment

### **'In the public domain'**

'In the public domain', as it applies herein, means technology that has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. (Copyright restrictions do not remove technology from being in the public domain.)

### **'Production'**

Production means all production phases such as:

- construction,
- production engineering,
- manufacture,
- integration,
- assembly (mounting),
- inspection,
- testing, and
- quality assurance.

### **'Technical assistance'**

May take forms, such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services. 'Technical assistance' may involve transfer of 'technical data'.

### **'Technical data'**

May take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

### **'Use'**

Operation, installation, (including on-site installation), maintenance, (checking), repair, overhaul or refurbishing.

## Biological agents

### Core List<sup>1</sup>

#### Viruses

- V1. Chikungunya virus
- V2. Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus
- V3. Dengue fever virus
- V4. Eastern equine encephalitis virus
- V5. Ebola virus
- V6. Hantaan virus
- V7. Junin virus
- V8. Lassa fever virus
- V9. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus
- V10. Machupo virus
- V11. Marburg virus
- V12. Monkey pox virus
- V13. Rift Valley fever virus
- V14. Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis virus)
- V15. Variola virus
- V16. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
- V17. Western equine encephalitis virus
- V18. White pox
- V19. Yellow fever virus
- V20. Japanese encephalitis virus
- V21. Kyasanur Forest virus
- V22. Louping ill virus
- V23. Murray Valley encephalitis virus

<sup>1</sup> Biological agents are controlled when they are an isolated live culture of a pathogen agent, or a preparation of a toxin agent which has been isolated or extracted from any source, or material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with the agent. Isolated live cultures of a pathogen agent include live cultures in dormant form or in dried preparations, whether the agent is natural, enhanced or modified. An agent is covered by this list except when it is in the form of a vaccine. A vaccine is a medicinal product in a pharmaceutical formulation licensed by, or having marketing or clinical trial authorisation from, the regulatory authorities of either the country of manufacture or of use, which is intended to stimulate a protective immunological response in humans or animals in order to prevent disease in those to whom or to which it is administered.

## Biological agents

- V24. Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus
- V25. Oropouche virus
- V26. Powassan virus
- V27. Rocio virus
- V28. St Louis encephalitis virus
- V29. Hendra virus (Equine morbillivirus)
- V30. South American haemorrhagic fever (Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito)
- V31. Pulmonary & renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever viruses (Seoul, Dobrava, Puumala, Sin Nombre)
- V32. Nipah virus

#### Rickettsiae

- R1. Coxiella burnetii
- R2. Bartonella quintana (Rochalimea quintana, Rickettsia quintana)
- R3. Rickettsia prowazeki
- R4. Rickettsia rickettsii

#### Bacteria

- B1. Bacillus anthracis
- B2. Brucella abortus
- B3. Brucella melitensis
- B4. Brucella suis
- B5. Chlamydia psittaci
- B6. Clostridium botulinum
- B7. Francisella tularensis
- B8. Burkholderia mallei (Pseudomonas mallei)
- B9. Burkholderia pseudomallei (Pseudomonas pseudomallei)
- B10. Salmonella typhi
- B11. Shigella dysenteriae
- B12. Vibrio cholerae
- B13. Yersinia pestis

## Biological agents

- B14. *Clostridium perfringens*, epsilon toxin producing types<sup>2</sup>  
 B15. Enterohaemorrhagic *Escherichia coli*, serotype O157 and other verotoxin producing serotypes

### Toxins as follow and subunits thereof:<sup>3</sup>

- T1. Botulinum toxins<sup>4</sup>  
 T2. *Clostridium perfringens* toxins  
 T3. Conotoxin  
 T4. Ricin  
 T5. Saxitoxin  
 T6. Shiga toxin  
 T7. *Staphylococcus aureus* toxins  
 T8. Tetrodotoxin  
 T9. Verotoxin  
 T10. Microcystin (Cyanginosin)  
 T11. Aflatoxins  
 T12. Abrin  
 T13. Cholera toxin  
 T14. Diacetoxyscirpenol toxin  
 T15. T-2 toxin  
 T16. HT-2 toxin  
 T17. Modeccin toxin  
 T18. Volkensin toxin  
 T19. *Viscum Album* Lectin 1 (Viscumin)

<sup>2</sup>It is understood that limiting this control to epsilon toxin-producing strains of *Clostridium perfringens* therefore exempts from control the transfer of other *Clostridium perfringens* strains to be used as positive control cultures for food testing and quality control.

<sup>3</sup>Excluding immunotoxins.

<sup>4</sup>Excluding botulinum toxins and conotoxins in product form meeting all of the following criteria:

- are pharmaceutical formulations designed for testing and human administration in the treatment of medical conditions;
- are pre-packaged for distribution as clinical or medical products; and
- are authorised by a state authority to be marketed as clinical or medical products.

## Plant pathogens

### Core List

#### Bacteria

- PB1. *Xanthomonas albilineans*  
 PB2. *Xanthomonas campestris* pv. *citri*  
 PB3. *Xanthomonas oryzae* pv. *oryzae* (*Pseudomonas campestris* pv. *Oryzae*)  
 PB4. *Clavibacter michiganensis* subsp. *sepedonicus* (*Corynebacterium michiganensis* subsp. *sepedonicum* or *Corynebacterium sepedonicum*)  
 PB5. *Ralstonia solanacearum* races 2 and 3 (*Pseudomonas solanacearum* races 2 and 3 or *Burkholderia solanacearum* races 2 and 3)

#### Fungi

- PF1. *Colletotrichum coffeanum* var. *virulans* (*Colletotrichum kahawae*)  
 PF2. *Cochliobolus miyabeanus* (*Helminthosporium oryzae*)  
 PF3. *Microcyclus ulei* (syn. *Dothidella ulei*)  
 PF4. *Puccinia graminis* (syn. *Puccinia graminis* f. sp. *tritici*)  
 PF5. *Puccinia striiformis* (syn. *Puccinia glumarum*)  
 PF6. *Pyricularia grisea* / *Pyricularia oryzae*

#### Viruses

- PV1. Potato Andean latent tymovirus  
 PV2. Potato spindle tuber viroid

#### Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms:

PG1 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the Core List.

PG2 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the Core List.

Technical note: Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified.

## Plant pathogens

### Items for Inclusion in Awareness-raising Guidelines

#### Bacteria

PWB1. *Xylella fastidiosa*

#### Fungi

PWF1. *Deuterophoma tracheiphila* (syn. *Phoma tracheiphila*)

PWF2. *Monilia rorei* (syn. *Moniliophthora rorei*)

#### Viruses

PWV1. Banana bunchy top virus

#### Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms:

PWG1 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the Awareness-raising Guidelines.

PWG2 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the Awareness-raising Guidelines.

**Technical note:** Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified.

## Animal pathogens

### Core List<sup>1</sup>

#### Viruses

AV1. African swine fever virus

AV2. Avian influenza virus<sup>2</sup>

AV3. Bluetongue virus

AV4. Foot and mouth disease virus

AV5. Goat pox virus

AV6. Herpes virus (Aujeszky's disease)

AV7. Hog cholera virus (synonym: swine fever virus)

AV8. Lyssa virus

AV9. Newcastle disease virus

AV10. Peste des petits ruminants virus

AV11. Porcine enterovirus type 9 (synonym: swine vesicular disease virus)

AV12. Rinderpest virus

AV13. Sheep pox virus

AV14. Teschen disease virus

AV15. Vesicular stomatitis virus

AV16. Lumpy skin disease virus

AV17. African horse sickness virus

#### Bacteria

AB3. *Mycoplasma mycoides*

#### Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms

AG1 Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.

AG2 Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.

**Technical note:** Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified.

<sup>1</sup>Except where the agent is in the form of a vaccine.

<sup>2</sup>This includes only those Avian influenza viruses of high pathogenicity as defined in EC Directive 92/40/EC: "Type A viruses with an IVPI (intravenous pathogenicity index) in 6 week old chickens of greater than 1.2: or Type A viruses H5 or H7 subtype for which nucleotide sequencing has demonstrated multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site of haemagglutinin"

## Press Releases

AG/Jun93/Press/Chair/10

### 2-10 June 1993, Paris

The twenty-five participating countries of the Australia Group (AG), together with the European Commission, met in Paris from 2-10 June 1993 to discuss ways of strengthening measures against the spread and use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW).

Three new members were welcomed to the Group at the meeting - Argentina, Hungary and Iceland. Members looked forward to working closely with these additional countries to prevent CBW proliferation and use.

Participants agreed in December 1992 that there was a continuing and important role for the Group in the harmonisation of national non-proliferation controls over CBW materials, in a manner consistent with the Group's primary interest in an effectively operating Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Following on from this agreement on major policy directions, participants in June focused primarily on technical aspects of the Group's work, as well as considering how to make this work better known and understood among countries not participating in the Group.

Consolidation of the Group's common export control lists was a major achievement of three subsidiary experts' meetings, which covered BW issues, CW dual-use equipment and CW precursor chemicals. In particular, participants finalised the package of comprehensive export controls on biological agents and such biological manufacturing equipment as could be used in biological weapons programs. Consolidation of the export control lists should ensure that countries with aspirations to develop chemical or biological weapons will find it increasingly difficult to acquire the necessary agents and equipment from member countries. A fourth meeting of experts, comprising representatives from licensing and customs authorities, discussed ways of implementing CBW export controls more effectively within member countries, and of increasing co-operation among enforcement officials.

## Press Releases

Participants reached agreement on a clearer understanding of procedures for ensuring that denials of an export of a listed item for CBW non-proliferation reasons by one member would be respected by all other members.

On the basis of an agreed framework for effective licensing arrangements for CBW-relevant export controls, ways and means were discussed for enhancing the effectiveness of national export controls, including the possibility of harmonisation of end-user undertakings and re-export controls among AG partners.

In keeping with the decision in December 1992 that the Group should make a positive effort to make its aims and activities better known, participants at the June meeting agreed to promote broad contacts with non-members following all future Australia Group meetings. Participants also resolved to expand their dialogue about CBW issues with non-member countries with a view to encouraging the introduction and effective implementation of CBW non-proliferation measures.

In this context, the participants welcomed plans for an Asian Export Control Seminar to be hosted by the Government of Japan on 25-27 October 1993 in Tokyo; and for the Fourth International Seminar against the Proliferation of CBW, to be convened in Oslo by the Government of Norway on 13-14 December 1993. The Group expressed the hope that the broadly based international dialogue which these seminars represent will further understanding of the specific, practical measures which can be taken to prevent association with CBW programs, and that it will foster a co-operative approach to resolving any difficulties arising from these measures.

Participants urged all countries to take the necessary steps to ensure that they and their industries are not contributing to the spread of chemical and biological weapons. In particular, they appealed to all countries to adopt export controls and measures on relevant materials, comparable to those adopted by members of the Australia Group, to halt the spread of chemical and biological weapons and thus support the global ban on these entire classes of weapons of mass destruction embodied in the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

## Press Releases

The participants agreed to meet again in Paris in December 1993.

The participants in the Australia Group are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States

## Press Releases

AG/Nov94/Press/Chair/14

### **29 November - 1 December 1994, Paris**

Australia Group participants held informal consultations in Paris from 29 November to 1 December 1994, to discuss the continuing incidence of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. These consultations stemmed initially from the disclosure in the 1980s that Iraq had exploited the international trade in chemicals and related technology to build up a massive chemical weapon (CW) stockpile. Participants at the latest talks were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, the member States of the European Union, the European Commission, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States, with the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic taking part for the first time.

Experts from participating countries discussed national export licensing systems aimed at preventing any inadvertent assistance to the production of CBW. They considered how to ensure that export licensing arrangements provide practical support for the global bans on these weapons, and that they function in a streamlined and effective manner so as to allow trade and the exchange of technology for peaceful purposes to flourish without restriction. They agreed to continue working to focus national measures efficiently and exclusively on preventing association with chemical and biological weapons programs. The lessons derived from practical experience in export licensing are assisting individual countries in their preparations for national implementation of their fundamental obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) while ensuring they do not restrict or impede trade and other exchanges not prohibited by that convention.

Participants maintain a strong belief that full adherence to the CWC and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the only way to bring about a permanent global ban on CBW. All states adhering to these conventions are obliged to ensure their national activities support this goal. The countries taking part in Australia Group discussions plan to be among the original States Parties of the CWC when it enters into force - all these countries have signed the Convention, five have already ratified it, and the others are actively preparing for early ratification.

The participants are taking steps to ensure that all relevant national regulations promote the object and purpose of the CWC and will be fully consistent with it upon its entry into force.

## Press Releases

Similar national policies seek to fulfil existing obligations under the BTWC not to assist the production of BW. As States Parties to the BTWC, all participating countries also support efforts to strengthen that convention.

Despite these international agreements, there are active chemical and biological weapons programs under way in some proliferating countries. The imperative remains for national measures to prevent civilian industry and traders from becoming unwitting contributors to these CBW programs. Participants consider that neglecting this responsibility would amount to tacit support for manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. National export licensing policies in the chemical sphere therefore fulfil the obligation established under Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the manufacture of CW. These measures are also consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials and related information for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, as they are focussed solely on preventing assistance to activities banned under the CWC. In this context, participants reaffirmed their national commitment to the statement made on behalf of Australia Group participating countries to the Conference on Disarmament in August 1992.

Participants also considered how best to contribute to international dialogue on the need for and role of national measures focussed on preventing assistance to CBW production in line with the international bans on these weapons. They agreed to continue with a wide range of contacts, including a further active program of detailed bilateral briefings for countries not participating in the talks, and to promote regional consultations to further awareness and understanding of national policies in this area: in this context, participants welcomed the Latin American regional seminar held in Buenos Aires on 15-16 November 1994. This approach reflects the strong desire of participants to ensure transparency of their national policies, to raise awareness about the importance of suitable export licensing as an integral part of global bans on chemical and biological weapons, and to encourage the implementation of appropriate national measures by all countries wishing to address responsibly the potential misuse of their products for CBW production.

Participants agreed to hold further consultations in October 1995.

PARIS

1st December 1994

## Press Releases

AG/Oct95/Press/Chair/16

### 16 - 18 October 1995, Paris

Australia Group participants held informal consultations at the Australian Embassy in Paris between 16-19 October 1995 to discuss the continuing incidence of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. These consultations stemmed initially from the disclosure in the 1980s that Iraq had exploited the international trade in chemicals and related technology to build up a massive chemical weapon (CW) stockpile. Participants at the latest talks were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States, with Romania taking part for the first time.

Experts from participating countries discussed national export licensing systems aimed at preventing any inadvertent assistance to the production of CBW. They endorsed the importance of export licensing arrangements in providing practical support for the global bans on these weapons, while confirming that members administer export controls in a streamlined and effective manner which allows trade and the exchange of technology for peaceful purposes to flourish without restriction. They agreed to continue working to focus national measures efficiently and exclusively on preventing any contribution to chemical and biological weapons programs. In this context the meeting agreed to several amendments to the lists of biological weapons-relevant materials and equipment, taking into account developments since these lists were last reviewed including recent revelations concerning the Iraqi BW program.

Participants maintain a strong belief that full adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the only way to bring about a permanent global ban on CBW. All states adhering to these conventions are obliged to ensure their national activities support this goal. The countries taking part in Australia Group discussions plan to be among the original States Parties of the CWC when it enters into force - all these countries have signed the Convention, fifteen have already ratified it, and the others are actively preparing for early ratification.

## Press Releases

The participants are taking steps to ensure that all relevant national regulations promote the object and purpose of the CWC and will be fully consistent with it upon its entry into force, and exchanged views at the meeting on their national approaches to this. The lessons derived from practical experience in export licensing are assisting individual countries in their preparations for national implementation of their principal obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) while ensuring they do not restrict or impede trade and other exchanges not prohibited by that convention.

Similar national policies seek to fulfill existing obligations under the BTWC not to assist the production of BW. As States Parties to the BTWC, all participating countries also support efforts to strengthen that convention through the negotiations commenced earlier in 1995 in the Ad Hoc Group.

Despite these international agreements, active chemical and biological weapons programs continue in some countries. The imperative accordingly remains for national measures to prevent civilian industry and traders from becoming unwitting contributors to these CBW programs. Participants consider that neglecting this responsibility would amount to tacit support for manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. National export licensing policies in the chemical sphere therefore fulfill the obligation established under Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the manufacture of CW. These measures are also consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials and related information for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, as they are focused solely on preventing assistance to activities banned under the CWC. In this context, participants reaffirmed their national commitment to the statement made on behalf of Australia Group participating countries to the Conference on Disarmament in August 1992.

Participants also considered how best to contribute to international dialogue on the need for and role of national measures focused on preventing assistance to CBW production in line with the international bans on these weapons.

## Press Releases

They agreed to continue with a wide range of contacts, including a further active program of briefings for countries not participating in the talks, and to promote regional consultations to further awareness and understanding of national policies in this area. In this context, participants welcomed Japan's plans to host a third Asian seminar on export controls in Tokyo in early 1996, and Romania's offer to convene a seminar on CBW export controls of Central and Eastern European countries and Commonwealth of Independent States in Bucharest in October 1996.

The meeting also discussed the terrorist use of CBW, noting that recent developments had heightened concerns about such risks.

Participants agreed to hold further consultations in October 1996.

PARIS  
19th October 1995

## Press Releases

AG/Oct96/Press/Chair/19

### 14 - 17 October 1996, Paris

Australia Group participants held informal consultations in Paris between 14-17 October 1996 to discuss the continuing problem of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. Participants at these talks were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States, with the Republic of Korea taking part for the first time.

Participants maintain a strong belief that full adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the best way to eliminate these types of particularly inhumane weapons from the world's arsenals. In this context, the maintenance of effective export controls will remain an essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC and the BTWC.

All participants at the meeting welcomed the expected entry into force of the CWC<sup>[1]\*</sup>, noting that this long awaited step will be an important, historic moment in international efforts to prohibit chemical weapons. Participants agreed to issue a separate statement on this matter, which is attached.

Participants also welcomed the progress of efforts to strengthen the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the Ad Hoc Group of BTWC States Parties in Geneva. All Australia Group participating countries are also States Parties to this Treaty, and strongly support efforts to develop internationally-agreed procedures for strengthening international confidence in the treaty regime by verifying compliance with BTWC obligations.

[1]\*The CWC is expected to come into operation in April 1997 or soon thereafter, 180 days after the 65th instrument of ratification is deposited with the UN Secretariat in New York. The number of ratifications currently stands at sixty-four.

## Press Releases

Experts from participating countries discussed national export licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent assistance to the production of CBW. They confirmed that participants administered export controls in a streamlined and effective manner which allows trade and the exchange of technology for peaceful purposes to flourish.

They agreed to continue working to focus these national measures efficiently and solely on preventing any contribution to chemical and biological weapons programs. Participants noted that the value of these measures in inhibiting CBW proliferation benefited not only the countries participating in the Australia Group, but the whole international community.

Participants also agreed to continue a wide range of contacts, including a further program of briefings for countries not participating in the Paris consultations to further awareness and understanding of national policies in this area. Participants endorsed in this context the importance of regional seminars as valuable means of widening contacts with other countries on these issues. In particular, Romania's plans to host a seminar on CBW export controls for Central and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States in Bucharest on 21-22 October and Japan's plans to host a fourth Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo in early 1997 were warmly welcomed by participants. Argentina will also host a regional seminar on non-proliferation matters, in Buenos Aires, in the first week of December 1996. France will organize a seminar for French-speaking countries on the implementation of the CWC. This will take place shortly before entry into force of the Convention.

The meeting also discussed relevant aspects of terrorist interest in CBW and agreed that this serious issue requires continuing attention.

Participants agreed to hold further consultations in October 1997.

PARIS  
17 October 1996

## Press Releases

AG/Oct97/Press/Chair/20

### 6-9 October 1997, Paris

Australia Group participants held informal consultations in Paris between 6-9 October 1997 to discuss the continuing problem of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. Their informal consultations were aimed in particular at cooperatively discussing and improving the application of national export licensing measures in order to prevent abuse of exports through the inadvertent supply by their own nationals of chemical precursors, biological agents or dual-use equipment to weapons of mass destruction programs.

Participants at these talks were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

All participants at the meeting welcomed the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 29 April 1997 as a long-awaited and important achievement in international efforts to abolish chemical weapons for all time, and they encouraged all countries which have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify that Convention. They noted with satisfaction the very good progress being achieved by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the implementation of the CWC.

In keeping with their strong commitment to both treaties, all Australia Group participating countries are States Parties to both the CWC and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Participants restated their strong belief that full adherence to the CWC and the BTWC will be the best way to rid the world of these heinous weapons of mass destruction for all time. In this context, participants agreed that continued informal cooperation in the maintenance of effective export licensing measures remains relevant and reinforces the effective implementation of these Conventions. Australia Group participants undertook to ensure the continued transparency of their national CBW export controls.

## Press Releases

Participants continued to review national exporting licensing policies to ensure that relevant national regulations promote the object and purpose of the CWC, are applied fairly, and remain fully consistent with it. Participants also recalled their previous expressions of support for the CWC, and reaffirmed these commitments.

Participants welcomed the progress of efforts to strengthen the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the Ad Hoc Group of BTWC States Parties in Geneva. All Australia Group participating countries restated their strong support for the development of internationally agreed procedures for strengthening international confidence in the treaty regime by verifying compliance with BTWC obligations.

Experts from participating countries also discussed national export licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent assistance to the production of chemical and biological weapons. They endorsed the importance of export licensing arrangements in providing practical support for the global bans on these weapons, while confirming that participants administered export controls in a streamlined and effective manner which allows trade and the exchange of technology for peaceful purposes to flourish. They agreed to continue to focus these national measures effectively and solely on preventing any contribution to chemical and biological weapons programs. Participants noted that the value of these measures in inhibiting CBW proliferation benefited the whole international community.

Participants agreed to continue a wide range of contacts, including a further program of briefings for countries not participating in the Paris consultations to further awareness and understanding of national policies in this area. Participants endorsed in this context the importance of regional seminars as valuable means of widening contacts with other countries on these issues. In this context, participants welcomed the Asian regional seminar on export controls held in Tokyo in January 1997 and the regional CBW export control seminar for countries of central and eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States held in October 1996.

The meeting also discussed relevant aspects of terrorist interest in CBW and agreed that this serious issue requires continuing attention.

Participants agreed to hold further consultations in October 1998.

## Press Releases

AG/Oct98/Press/Chair/21

### 9-15 October 1998, Paris

Australia Group participants held informal consultations in Paris from 9-15 October 1998 on chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation.

Participants discussed their national export licensing measures and procedures to ensure that they continue to be effective in preventing any contribution to chemical and biological weapons programs through the inadvertent supply of chemical precursors, biological agents and dual-use equipment and that they did not inhibit the trade in chemical precursors, biological agents and dual-use equipment for legitimate purposes. They reaffirmed that their national export licensing measures were directed solely at preventing CBW proliferation.

Participants agreed that implementing such national measures was an important way of meeting their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) by striving to prevent the intentional or inadvertent supply by their nationals of materials or equipment to chemical or biological weapons programs. Participants encouraged all countries that are not participants in the Australia Group to implement similar measures to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons. They expressed their willingness to assist others in implementing such measures on a national basis.

Participants reaffirmed their strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. In line with Convention obligations, participants committed to keep under review their respective national exporting licensing policies to ensure that they promote the object and purpose of the CWC, are applied fairly and remain fully consistent with it.

They also welcomed efforts by the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC. All participants agreed that a legally-binding verification protocol to the BTWC should be concluded as a matter of priority.

## Press Releases

Australia Group participating countries expressed their belief that universal adherence to and compliance with these two treaties would be the most effective way to rid the world of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. They agreed that their informal consultations complemented and were consistent with the purpose of these Conventions.

Participants agreed to continue a program to promote greater awareness and understanding of the important role that national export licensing measures play in preventing CBW proliferation. This program will continue to include briefings for countries not participating in the Australia Group and regional seminars on export licensing practices.

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States participated in these talks.

## Press Releases

AG/Oct99/Press/Chair/22

### 4-8 October 1999, Paris

Australia Group participants held informal consultations in Paris from 4-8 October 1999 on chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation.

Participants discussed their national export licensing measures and procedures to ensure that they continue to be effective in preventing any contribution to chemical and biological weapons programs through the inadvertent supply of chemical precursors, biological agents and dual-use equipment and that they did not inhibit the trade in these items. They reaffirmed that their national chemical and biological export licensing measures were directed solely at preventing CBW proliferation, and were designed not to hamper legitimate trade.

Participants agreed that implementing such national measures was an important way of meeting their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) by striving to prevent the intentional or inadvertent supply by their nationals of materials or equipment to chemical or biological weapons programs. Participants encouraged all countries that are not participants in the Australia Group to implement similar national measures to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons. They expressed their willingness, on a national basis, to continue assisting others in implementing such measures and in improving the effectiveness of their export control mechanisms.

Participants reaffirmed their strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. In line with Convention obligations, participants committed to keep under review their respective national exporting licensing policies to ensure that they promote the object and purpose of the CWC, are applied fairly and remain fully consistent with it. They also welcomed efforts by the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC. All participants reaffirmed their commitment to concluding an effective and legally-binding verification protocol to the BTWC as a matter of priority.

## Press Releases

Australia Group participating countries expressed their belief that universal adherence to and full compliance with these two treaties would be the most effective way to rid the world of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. They agreed that their informal consultations complemented and were consistent with the purpose of these Conventions.

Participants agreed to continue a program to promote greater awareness and understanding of the important role that national export licensing measures play in preventing CBW proliferation. This program will continue to include briefings for countries not participating in the Australia Group and regional seminars on export licensing practices.

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States participated in these talks.

## Press Releases

AG/Oct00/Press/23

### 2-5 October 2000, Paris

Informal consultations were held among a group of countries opposed to the spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW), known as the Australia Group, in Paris from 2-5 October. The Group welcomed two new participants, the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey.

The Group reaffirmed the common purpose of all participants of upholding the aims of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), to rid the world of these illegal and indiscriminate weapons. Participants confirmed their commitment to the successful conclusion of the negotiations currently taking place in Geneva to secure a protocol to strengthen the BWC.

The Group further reaffirmed the belief of all participants that effective export licensing at national level, on a non-discriminatory basis, is critical to achieving the aims of the conventions to abolish CBW and to facilitate the use of chemical and biological technology for peaceful purposes by ensuring that dual use items are not transferred for CBW-related purposes.

The Group recognised the changing technical environment in which the fight against the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is taking place, and made a number of adjustments to the common lists which form the basis for the national measures taken by its participants. Most significantly the Group Participants ensured that their respective national stances on transfers of chemical mixtures were brought into line with the recent decisions of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The Group also recognised the importance of transparency in its operations, endorsing a new web-site, which will shortly be posted at [www.australiagroup.net](http://www.australiagroup.net), and plans for a brochure and detailed paper outlining the Group's role in opposing CBW proliferation.

## Press Releases

AG/Oct01/Press/Chair/24

### Tackling the threat of chemical and biological weapons

At their annual meeting in Paris (1-4 October), the 33 countries from Europe, the Asia-Pacific and the Americas which constitute the Australia Group re-affirmed their commitment to strengthening national efforts to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW).

The Australia Group is an informal network of countries that consult on and harmonise their national export licensing measures on CBW items. Participants aim to prevent any inadvertent contribution to chemical or biological weapons programs. Participants in the Australia Group condemned the callous terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September and observed one minute's silence in memory of the victims.

Participants expressed the resolve of their governments to prevent CBW proliferation, whether by state or non-state actors. Recalling that terrorist groups have used or tried to use chemical and biological agents in the past, participants agreed that the Australia Group has an important role to play in reducing the threat of CBW terrorist attacks.

During consultations the Australia Group reviewed developments in CBW proliferation over the past year and affirmed the continuing effectiveness of national export controls on dual-use items that can be used in CBW programs. In light of technological developments since its last meeting, the Group updated the common control lists that form the basis for harmonising the national measures of all participants.

Participants reiterated their commitment to fair and transparent trade in chemical and biological materials for peaceful purposes. They agreed that the non-discriminatory application of national export licensing measures allows legitimate trade to expand unhampered by proliferation fears. They urged all countries that are not participants in the Australia Group to implement similar national measures to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Participants expressed their willingness, on a national basis, to continue assisting others to improve the effectiveness of their export controls.

## Press Releases

Participants welcomed Bulgaria to the Group. This brings total participation in 33 countries plus the European Commission.

All Australia Group participants are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). These conventions legally oblige all states parties, inter alia, not to assist in any way the development and production of chemical and biological weapons anywhere. Participants re-affirmed the central role of national export controls in this regard.

Consistent with their commitment to transparency and public outreach, participants welcomed the establishment of the Australia Group website ([www.australiagroup.net](http://www.australiagroup.net)).

Australia Group participants maintain an active outreach program aimed at discussing continuing CBW proliferation concerns and exchanging views regarding export controls. They agreed to continue promoting greater public awareness and understanding of the Group's activities in the lead-up to its next meeting in June 2002.

## Press Releases

Press Release: June 7, 2002

### **New measures to fight the spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons**

Concluding its annual meeting in Paris (3-6 June), the Australia Group today agreed to adopt tougher export controls aimed at preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), including to terrorist groups.

The Australia Group is an informal network of countries that consult on and harmonise their national export licensing measures on CBW items. Participants aim to prevent any inadvertent contribution to chemical or biological weapons programs. The thirty-three participating countries from Europe, the Asia-Pacific and the Americas, plus the European Commission, have agreed to:

- adopt formal guidelines governing the licensing of sensitive chemical and biological items. These guidelines are public, consistent with the Group's strong commitment to transparency. All countries are encouraged to adhere to these guidelines in the interest of international peace and security.
- include a 'catch-all' provision in its guidelines. This is the first time that an export control regime has agreed to include a 'catch-all' clause in its public guidelines, reflecting the resolve of participating national governments to use all means at their disposal to fight the spread of CBW.
- apply more rigorous controls to the export of fermenters, lowering the volume threshold from 100 litres to 20 litres. This offers a substantial increase in security against terrorists seeking equipment for CBW attacks.
- add eight new toxins to the Group's biological control list, raising to 19 the total number of controlled toxins.
- control technology associated with dual-use biological equipment which could be used to manufacture biological weapons.
- control, for the first time, the intangible transfer of information and knowledge which could be used for CBW purposes.

The Group agreed to additional measures to promote awareness of the threat of CBW proliferation through publication of the Australia Group booklet - "Fighting the spread of chemical and biological weapons: Strengthening global security". This complements the Australia Group website [www.australiagroup.net](http://www.australiagroup.net).

## Press Releases

Participants reiterated their commitment to fair and transparent trade in chemical and biological materials for peaceful purposes. They agreed that the non-discriminatory application of national export licensing measures allows legitimate trade to expand unhampered by proliferation fears.

All Australia Group participants are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). These conventions legally oblige all state parties, inter alia, not to assist in any way the development and production of chemical and biological weapons anywhere. Participants re-affirmed the central role of national export controls in this regard.

**Press release issued by the Australian Embassy, Paris, 4 rue Jean Rey, 75724 Paris Cedex 15.**

## Press Releases

Press Release: June , 2003

### **Strengthening Measures to Prevent the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

At the conclusion of its annual meeting in Paris (2-5 June), the Australia Group reinforced its determination to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in the face of existing and emerging threats by agreeing to a series of new measures to further strengthen export controls.

The Australia Group is an informal network of countries that consult on and harmonise their national export licensing measures on CBW-relevant items as a complement to their obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Participants aim to prevent any inadvertent contribution from their industry and research community to CBW programs. Currently, 33 countries - from Europe, the Asia-Pacific and the Americas, plus the European Commission - participate in the Group.

Reviewing developments over the past year, participants stressed that the importance of preventing the spread of CBW was greater than ever before in the 18-year history of the Group. Efforts by terrorists to acquire CBW were identified as presenting a significant challenge, in addition to ongoing concerns over state weapons programs.

New measures agreed by the Group include:

- Addition of 14 biological agents (human pathogens) to the Biological Control List.
- Endorsement of a cooperative program of action for more effectively engaging countries in the Asia-Pacific region on CBW-related export control issues - a response, in part, to specific requests from several countries in that region.
- Approval of a practical guide for compliance and enforcement officers to help them more efficiently detect, identify and prevent illegitimate transfers of items controlled by the Australia Group.
- New procedures for improving transparency and enhancing information sharing among members.

## Press Releases

Discussion at the meeting was wide-ranging and advanced considerably issues of abiding interest, including the desirability of controlling new precursor and other types of chemicals, as well as dissemination devices for biological agents. Participants identified additional chemicals that would be considered for inclusion on the control list over coming months.

Participants also reiterated their commitment to fair and transparent trade in chemical and biological materials for peaceful purposes. They agreed that non-discriminatory application of national export licensing measures allows legitimate trade to expand unhampered by proliferation fears. As parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, participants reaffirmed that such measures were fully consistent with all of our obligations under these conventions.

## Press Releases

Media Release

### 2004 Australia Group Plenary

The Australia Group met for its annual plenary in Paris from 7-10 June to further strengthen participating countries' export control measures for preventing the production and spread of chemical and biological weapons.

The Australia Group welcomed five new members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia. All new members participated in the 2004 Plenary, expanding the reach of the Group's activities.

The 2004 Plenary was held against the backdrop of significant developments in global non-proliferation including Libya's decision to forgo its chemical weapons program, the revelation of the Khan proliferation network and unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The resolution calls on states to establish effective national export controls, among other non-proliferation measures. The work of the Australia Group will play a key role in international efforts to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

Against this background, participants noted growing acceptance of Australia Group measures as the international benchmark in relation to export controls directed at chemical and biological weapons, owing in large part to the Group's ongoing outreach activities. Accordingly, participants agreed strategies for better targeted training and assistance, particularly at a regional level, to assist key supplier and transshipping countries and other interested countries outside the Group to enhance their export controls.

In response to increasingly sophisticated procurement activities, the Australia Group agreed to consider the issue of brokering controls. Such controls could play a key role in curtailing the activities of intermediaries and front companies.

As part of the Group's ongoing efforts to keep its common control lists up to date and scientifically relevant, participants agreed to add five plant pathogens to the control lists the first such addition since 1993 and to expand medical exemptions for one of the controlled toxins.

## Press Releases

Participants also advanced consideration of further additions to the control lists, including airborne spraying and fogging systems capable of dispersing biological agents in aerosol form.

Discussions dealing with information sharing and enforcement provided clearer insights into proliferation behavior by state and non-state actors and mechanisms for more effectively enforcing export controls.

The next plenary meeting of the Australia Group to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Group will be held in Australia in 2005.